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The Power of Integrality: 
Linkages between Product Architecture, Innovation, and Industry Structure 
 
Abstract 
A substantial literature stream suggests that many products are becoming more modular over 
time, and that this development is often associated with a change in industry structure towards 
higher degrees of specialization.  These developments can have strong implications for an 
industry’s competition as the history of the PC industry illustrates.  To add to our understanding 
of the linkages between product architecture, innovation, and industry structure we develop 
detailed product architecture measurements based on a previously proposed method (Fixson, 
2005) and study an unusual case in which a firm – through decreasing its product modularity – 
turned its formerly competitive industry into a near-monopoly.  Using this case study we explore 
how existing theories on modularity explain the observed phenomenon, and show that most 
consider technological change in rather long-term dimensions, and tend to focus on efficiency-
related arguments to explain the resulting forces on competition.  We add three critical aspects to 
the theory that connects technological change and industry dynamics.  First, we suggest 
integrating as a new design operator to explain product architecture genesis.  Second, we argue 
that a finer-grained analysis of the product architecture shows the existence of multiple linkages 
between product architecture and industry structure, and that these different linkages help 
explain the observed intra-industry heterogeneity across firms.  Third, we propose that the firm 
boundary choice can also be a pre-condition of the origin of architectural innovation, not only an 
outcome of efficiency considerations. 
Keywords 
Product Architecture, Integrality, Modularity, Technological Change, Intra-industry 
Heterogeneity, Industry Structure, Competition, Strategy 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Technological change has a rich history in several literature streams.  Disciplines ranging 
from economics, sociology, and technology history (Sahal, 1981; Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Rosenberg, 1982; Bijker, 1995) to technology management and strategic management (Anderson 
and Tushman, 1990; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Utterback, 1994; Macher and Mowery, 2004) 
have investigated the intricate interconnections between technological innovations and industry 
evolution.  Research in the former stream tends to view such cause-effect relationships in longer 
time frames and on the industry level, while research in the latter stream focuses on shorter time 
frames and individual firms.  Both have explored a variety of technology characteristics and their 
effects on competition. 
More recently, one aspect of technology that has generated interest is the role that the 
product structure plays in the competitive positions of firms in an industry, hence in industry 
structure (Baldwin and Clark, 2000).  Product structures, also often labeled product architectures, 
have been conceptually categorized into two archetypes: integral and modular (Ulrich, 1995; 
Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Schilling, 2000).  The classic illustration for a product with a modular 
product architecture is the personal computer; other examples include software, some recent 
textbooks, and sectional sofas.  A substantial literature body suggests that many products are 
becoming more modular over time, and that this development is often associated with a change 
in industry structure towards higher degrees of specialization (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; 
Langlois, 2002; Jacobides, 2005).   
While some research exists that includes the possibility of reversal of the process of 
modularization towards higher levels of integrality (Fine, 1998; Schilling, 2000; Christensen et 
al., 2002), the majority of empirical work supports the notion of a product architecture evolution 
from integral to modular product architectures.  For example, computers have been identified as 
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initially having had a rather integral architecture that later evolved towards significantly higher 
degrees of modularity (Baldwin and Clark, 2000).  Similarly, internet browser software 
(MacCormack et al., 2006), numerical controllers (Shibata et al., 2005), and college textbooks 
(Schilling, 2000) have been found to migrate towards higher levels of modularity, and only 
temporarily, if at all, to revert back to more integral structures in case of external technology 
shocks.  For example, Shibata et al. (2005) find that the introduction of the microprocessor unit 
(MCU) in numerical controls in 1969 resulted in a more integral architecture for only a few 
years.  Once the shock caused by this new technology was absorbed, the modularization process 
continued.   
The prevalent notion of the sequence of events is the following.  Early in an industry’s life, 
the initial (engineering) design choices set the ground rules for which ‘transfers’ can become 
‘transactions’ by making them standardized, countable, and evaluable (Baldwin and Clark, 
2008), and in consequence, cause the emergence of interaction patterns across an entire industry.  
Jacobides et al. (2006) call the resulting industry structure the industry architecture.  Once this 
industry structure has emerged, it imposes substantial constraints on industry participants with 
respect to both firm boundary location choices and product design choices.  At the same time, 
increasing knowledge and technology advancements enable the codification of increasing 
number of exchanges across interfaces, thus causing further product modularization and firm 
specialization.  In these later stages it becomes very difficult for individual firms to break out of 
the established industry architecture via changes in the overall product architecture.   
Given this fairly broadly shared understanding of (i) mostly increasing modularity, and (ii) 
an increase in modularity causing increasing vertical specialization in the associated industry, we 
were intrigued by a case that appeared not to fit that pattern.  This case is the bicycle drivetrain 
component industry during the 1980s.  The bicycle drivetrain component industry supplies six 
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components to the bicycle assemblers: shifters, derailleurs, freewheels, chains, hubs, and brake 
shifters; each bicycle has one of each.  In the early 1980s, the industry was fairly competitive and 
included both small and large firms.  In total, well over 50 firms were active in the industry, and 
over half of those developed and manufactured only three or fewer of the six components, i.e., 
many of them were fairly specialized.  At the same time, two firms produced all six components 
and a third firm made four components and had strategic partnerships for the remaining ones.  
The individual market shares of these latter three firms ranged from 8% to 30% in the individual 
component market segments (top panel in Figure 1).  Across the entire industry all components 
were interchangeable both within and across firms, i.e., a derailleur from one firm was as 
compatible with a chain from one of its competitors as it was with a chain from its production. 
By 1990, the industry structure had drastically changed.  The total bicycle market had split 
into two major categories, one for road bicycles (RB) and one for mountain bicycles (MTB); 
together those categories accounted for almost 90% of the total market (Table 1).  Shimano had 
become by far the dominating firm for bicycle drivetrain components in both categories, with 
slightly less than 60% market share in the RB category, and almost 80% market share in the 
MTB category, in both categories evenly across all six component segments.  The rest of the 
market was occupied by two other firms, Suntour and Campagnolo, and some minor niche firms 
(bottom two panels in Figure 1).  Each of the three major firms offered integrated component 
sets, i.e., their components were no longer compatible across firms.  In fact, they were often 
incompatible across product lines within the firms. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
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Thus between 1980 and 1990, the industry migrated not towards higher levels of 
disintegration but towards a much higher level of integration – both within and across the 
individual component segments.  In the middle of the decade, one firm had introduced a new 
product design with an integral architecture including non-compatible components.  This firm, 
Shimano, came to dominate the industry by the end of the decade. 
Since anomalies offer particularly valuable opportunities to advance theory building 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Carlile and Christensen, 2005) we use this relatively unusual case of 
decreasing product modularity that is linked to substantial changes in industry structure to 
explore the linkages between product architecture, innovation, and industry structure in more 
detail.  Specifically, we re-construct in detail the history of both the product architecture and 
industry structure to establish a time sequence of change events.  The sequence of events allows 
us to rule out the hypothesis that industry structure change brought about the change in product 
architecture.  To establish the credibility of causality in the reverse direction (product 
architecture change caused industry structure change) requires us also controlling for alternative 
explanations of the observed events.  To do so we collect data on additional variables such as 
advertising and pricing.   
With this paper we attempt to contribute to the answers of two interrelated questions.  First, 
why did the product architecture shift towards higher level of integrality instead of remaining 
modular?  Second, if there is a change towards higher degrees of product architecture integrality, 
how do these changes affect the structure of an industry?  More specifically, what are the causal 
mechanisms at work here, what is the sequence in which they operate, and what was the start of 
this chain of effects?  Together, the answers to these questions will contribute to a better 
understanding of the factors that determine firms’ strategies with respect to product architecture 
change, and more broadly to the role of technological change in industry evolution. 
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In the next section we create a framework for our overall research design and develop 
detailed measures for both product architecture and industry structure.  The product architecture 
measurement we develop is a refinement of a previously suggested method for product 
architecture assessment (Fixson, 2005).  Using these measures we present the detailed case data 
in section three.  In section four, we apply the framework to explore how the extant literature 
would explain the observed events and what gaps exist in the explanation.  In section five we 
focus on the gaps in the literature and suggest theory to address them.  Section six concludes. 
 
2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Studying the cause-effect relationships between changes in product architecture and changes 
in industry structure demands a detailed understanding of the change processes themselves that 
occur within the technical domain and the industry domain.  This, in turn, requires a longitudinal 
research design (Poole et al., 2000).  Following Pettigrew’s advice that “.. theoretically sound 
and practically useful research on change should explore the contexts, content, and process of 
change together with their interconnections through time” (Pettigrew, 1990:269) we create a 
research framework that can discern between the numerous cause-effect relationships over time 
and develop detailed measures for both domains.   
2.1 Research Framework 
Our research framework fundamentally establishes two separate domains: the product 
architecture and the industry structure (Figure 2).  In the product architecture domain, any 
product architecture at any given point in time can be represented by its location somewhere on 
the spectrum between modular and integral product architectures.  A change in product 
architecture, then, is represented by a shift of this location; for example, from being rather 
integral (PA2) to rather modular (PA1).  Similarly, in the industry structure domain an industry’s 
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structure can be represented by the location on the spectrum between integrated and disintegrated 
industry structures.  A industry’s change from one structure to another, then, can be illustrated by 
a shift of location; for example, from integrated (IS2) to disintegrated (IS1).  Next, to search for 
possible cause-effect relationships between a change in one domain and a change in the other 
domain, the research framework lists four possible effects – (a) through (d) in Figure 2 – that are 
separated by directionality and order of change sequences.  Finally, to control for effects that 
originate outside of either domain but potentially cause shifts in either product architecture or 
industry structure, the framework lists two external causes for each domain – (e) and (f) for 
product architecture changes, and (g) and (h) for industry structure changes. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
2.2 Data Sources, Time Period, Sampling Frame and Frequency 
The bicycle market in the U.S. witnessed substantial changes with regards to product 
offerings between 1980 and 1990.  In the early 1980s, road bicycles (RB) were the only type of 
bicycle that was available.  This picture changed with the advent of the mountain bicycles 
(MTB) in the mid-1980s.  Throughout the 1980s the fraction of RBs offered decreased from 
100% in 1980 to 44.1% in 1990 while the MTB market share rose over the same period from 0% 
to 45.2%.  All through the decade these two categories represented more than 90% of the U.S. 
bicycle market (Table 1).  Consequently, we focus our analysis on the bicycle component firms 
that supply drivetrain components for these two categories of bicycles.   
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To construct the historical accounts of the bicycle drivetrain industry and product 
architecture we collected both quantitative and qualitative data.  For the purpose of triangulation 
of our data we used a variety of data sources.  We collected archival data from magazines, data 
bases, books, news articles, and academic journals.  In particular, we scanned a decade of all 
issues of the magazine Bicycling, which was the leading trade journal in the U.S. during the 
1980s.  In addition, starting in 1984, Bicycling published the Super Spec Database (SSD), an 
annual listing of all new bicycle models introduced at price points over $150, including the 
information on the suppliers of each component.  Four additional sources were particularly 
helpful in understanding bicycle drivetrain technology and the technical changes that occurred 
during the 1980s.  These were the Proceedings of the International Cycling History Conference, 
and the books Bicycling Science by David Wilson (2004), The Dancing Chain: History and 
Development of the Derailleur Bicycle by Frank Berto (2005), and Sutherland’s Handbook for 
Bicycle Mechanics (1996).  To verify our archival findings, we also collected data through face-
to-face interviews and via e-mail.  We checked data with company representatives, industry 
observers, technical journalists, and editors of bicycling-related magazines, and we learned 
details on component compatibility from bicycle mechanics with years of experience in the 
bicycle repair business. 
As the time period of our analysis we decided on the decade from 1980 to 1990, with the 
major product architecture change occurring in the middle of our observation period.  The time 
period also covers drastic changes in industry structure and composition.  In general, multiple 
architectures may exist at the same time in an industry.  To account for this possibility, we 
measure two product architectures at each point in time.  One is Shimano’s most advanced 
architecture; the second is representative for the rest of the industry.  By representative we mean 
the typical product architecture, i.e., the most common product architecture (mode), excluding 
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Shimano’s.  The actual detailed assessment of the product architecture we conducted in years in 
which we observed a product architecture change from either Shimano or the rest of the industry.  
This approach leads to four data sets across the decade: t-1=1980, t0=1985, t1=1988, and t2=1990. 
2.3 Measures 
To develop appropriate measures for product architecture and industry structure we build on 
existing work, and extend it to produce finer grained measures for our empirical study.  
2.3.1 Product Architecture 
Architectures have been identified as a key element for design, operation, and behavior of 
complex engineering systems (Crawley et al., 2004).  We focus here on one type of technical 
system: assembled hardware products.  For such products, Ulrich suggests that the product 
architecture is “the scheme by which the function of a product is allocated to physical 
components” (Ulrich, 1995:419).  This scheme includes (i) the arrangement of functional 
elements, (ii) the mapping from functional elements to physical components, and (iii) the 
specification of the interfaces.  Conceptually, product architectures are often categorized into one 
of two archetypes: modular or integral.  While conceptually very powerful, the operationalization 
of these archetypes has proven to be quite difficult, and various approaches have been chosen to 
overcome this difficulty (Fixson, 2007).  For example, some scholars use indirect measures, i.e., 
they assess the degree of product modularity indirectly by asking managers to estimate the 
degree to which certain consequences that are often associated with modularity – for example, 
the degree to which a buyer can customize a product, or the degree to which a manufacturing 
process allows late configuration – are more or less true for their own products (Duray et al., 
2000; Worren et al., 2002; Tu et al., 2004).  Others, particularly in the engineering literature, 
have developed numerous approaches to measure product architecture characteristics such as 
modularity, commonality, and platforms directly on the product (Nelson et al., 2001; Fujita and 
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Yoshida, 2004; Simpson and D'Souza, 2004).  The majority of these latter approaches takes a 
product architecture in its overall structure as a given, and then searches for the optimal solution 
in the configuration space. 
Most real products lie somewhere between the extremes of modular or integral (Ulrich, 
1995; Schilling, 2000).  What matters then are the relative differences, either between products 
or between product generations over time.  In theoretical explorations of modularity, researchers 
have emphasized a system’s ability to separate and recombine its elements without much loss of 
functionality (Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Schilling, 2000).  Separation requires the 
concentration of some functionality in certain components, and recombination requires certain 
interface characteristics.  To account for these two major dimensions – function-component 
allocation and interfaces – we employ a product architecture assessment methodology that 
measures product architectures independently along these two dimensions (Fixson, 2005).  This 
method builds on Ulrich’s earlier description but relaxes Ulrich’s definition of product 
architecture in three important ways.   
First, it allows the two dimensions function-component allocation and interfaces to vary 
independently from each other.  While changes in two or more product architecture 
characteristics can occur simultaneously, they do not have to.  For example, two product 
architectures could exhibit identical function-component allocation schemes, but differ in the 
degree to which their interfaces are standardized.  As an example, think of the different electric 
plug and outlet combinations in different countries.  In all countries the function allocation 
between the energy transmitting element, the wires in the wall, and the energy consuming 
element, say a lamp, are identical.  The interfaces, however, i.e., the shape of the plugs and 
sockets are often country specific. 
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Second, the assessment method defines the dimension interfaces as composed of three 
separate sub-characteristics: interface strength, interface irreversibility, and interface 
standardization.1  Interface strength describes the interface’s technical nature (transfer of 
mechanical forces, materials, signals, etc.) and includes a measure of intensity.  Interface 
irreversibility measures the effort required to disconnect the interface, an aspect important if the 
product is expected to vary over its own lifetime.  Interface standardization we use as 
synonymous to compatible, i.e., it is a measure that describes the degree to which neighboring 
components that are manufactured by the same or another firm are compatible with components 
of the product architecture under investigation.   
Finally, the third relaxation of Ulrich’s definition guarantees an assessment of the degree of 
modularity per individual function, instead of creating an average modularity assessment for the 
entire product or system.  The underlying rationale for this approach is that products can be 
modular with respect to some functions but much more integral with respect to other functions at 
the same time.  For example, the tires of an automobile can be considered highly modular 
whereas the body structure typically is not.  The automobile’s product architecture then 
comprises simultaneously modular and integral aspects. 
To illustrate this assessment method we apply it below to the bicycle drivetrain component 
set that includes shifter, derailleur, freewheel, chain, and hub, plus brake levers at the beginning 
of our analysis period (t-1 = 1980).  To measure the function-component allocation we construct a 
matrix containing the relevant functions (‘power transmission’ and ‘gear shifting,’ plus ‘brake 
actuation’ for control purposes) in its first column, and all components in the first row.2  If a 
                                                 
1 The interface characteristics strength and irreversibility were re-labeled from originally type and reversibility, 
respectively. 
2 The rationale for the choice of the level of analysis for both functions and components should be meaningful for 
the analysis goal at hand (Fixson, 2005).  Equally important, it should be explicit and stable over time. 
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component contributes to a function, then the corresponding cell is marked with a ‘1.’  With help 
of this matrix we then calculate two indices: the component count index simply counts the 
number of components that contribute to a function, and the entanglement index counts the total 
number of functions these components are contributing to.  Together, these two indices measure 
the degree to which (and how) a particular function-component allocation deviates from the 
modular ‘ideal’ of a one-to-one function-component allocation.  Table 2 shows the function-
component allocation assessment matrix for Shimano’s product architecture in 1980.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
To measure the interface characteristics strength and irreversibility we construct a matrix 
that lists all components in its first column and its first row.  Above the diagonal we describe the 
interface strength by assessing each interface on a scale from –2 to +2 for each of the four 
categories mechanical, material, energy, and signal (Pimmler and Eppinger, 1994).  Below the 
diagonal, we assess the degree of interface irreversibility by separately estimating the effort 
required to disconnect the interface and the interface’s position in the overall product 
architecture, i.e., how many other components have to be removed before the interface in 
question can be disconnected.  Figure 3 shows the assessments for Shimano’s product 
architecture in 1980.  There are four interfaces in this drivetain system (out of a possible fifteen): 
one interface connects the shifter to the derailleur, the derailleur interacts with the chain, the 
chain with the sprockets of the freewheel, and the freewheel with the hub.  To aggregate these 
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measures to the function level, we sum the assessments for all interfaces of the components 
involved in each function.3  The higher the sum, the less modular is the function.   
To measure the interface characteristic standardization we define an interface as the 
interaction between two components.  For each of the two components the number of 
alternatives can vary.  More specifically, if both components participating in an interface are 
unique – for either technical, legal, or economic reason – we assign a low degree of 
standardization to the interface (a measure of 1,1 in the lower left of Figure 4).  Other the other 
hand, if for both components of an interface multiple alternatives exist across the industry we 
assign a high degree of standardization (a measure of 3,3 in the upper right in Figure 4).  As 
mentioned in the introduction, due to the existing de-facto standardization in the early 1980s, all 
interfaces in our study fall into the high-standardization category, see for example the derailleur-
chain interface.4  In sum, we view the universe of possible degrees of standardization as 
determined by the size of the population of alternatives that exists on either side of the interface.5  
To aggregate the measurement to a function level we simply take the average of the interfaces of 
the components participating in the function.   
                                                 
3 This approach implicitly assumes equal weight for each of the four categories of interface strength.  For the 
purpose of observing change over time within a given technology this approach is justified. 
4 To assess the degree of standardization we determined two aspects of the component-component pair that 
constitutes the interface: (i) the technical compatibility between the components, and (ii) the population size of 
alternatives for one, or both, of the components.  Technical compatibility in our framework is a binary decision 
with ‘no’ cases only present in the lower left corner of , whereas all other cases represent a ‘yes.’  To 
make that binary decision of component compatibility we used two different data sources: We screened all issues 
of Bicycling Magazine from 1980 to 1990 to learn about compatibility issues with newly introduce products, and 
we studied the compatibility of components relevant to our study with help of Sutherland’s Handbook for Bicycle 
Mechanics (6th edition), which is a technical report for bicycle mechanics.  The handbook details on 450 pages the 
interchangeability between individual components.  For the cases in which technical component compatibility was 
determined, we categorized the population size into three categories with help of model market share data from the 
Superspec Database.  This approach allowed us to place every interface into one of the nine categories of . 
Figure 4
Figure 4
5 The concept of interface standardization as applied here is based on Fixson (2005).  More recently, Jacobides et al. 
(2006) follow a similar line of thought in their separation of complementary and mobility of assets.  Their 
definition of complementary of assets is similar to our view on compatibility of components.  Their concept of 
asset mobility is similar to our idea of population size of components, both describe the number of alternatives. 
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Table 3 summarizes the complete product architecture assessment results.  The numerical 
assessments can be interpreted against the extreme points of the underlying scales.  Both 
component count index and entanglement index are one-sided anchored (‘1’ is the minimum, 
representing ‘perfect’ modularity).  Given that the maximum values are driven by product 
complexity, the values in Table 3 show relatively low numbers, albeit on different levels for 
different functions.  The values for interface strength and interface irreversibility, i.e., ‘6’ and 
‘5’, respectively, can be considered medium when compared to the possible extreme value of 
’16.’  Finally, the standardization assessment (3,3) for both relevant functions is high within the 
framework developed in Figure 4. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Note that while some aspects of our view of product architecture overlap with what has been 
discussed in the literature as dominant designs (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback, 1994; 
Tushman and Murmann, 1998), some important differences remain.  Much of the dominant 
design literature attempts to assign a design’s dominance to a combination of some technical and 
market measures, whereas we simply use our framework to describe technical product 
architecture changes over time.6  In general, our assessment method, while shedding light on 
                                                 
6 For example, a similarity between a recent proposed framework for the study of dominant designs and our product 
architecture assessment method is how a product’s functionality is provided by the components.  Murmann and 
Frenken (2006) suggest to understand products and systems as complex hierarchical systems, determined by their 
physical hierarchy and their operating principle.  Their approach to represent “an architecture [..] by a matrix 
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product architectures, cannot be used to identify dominant designs as the latter encompasses 
additional conceptual dimensions.7 
2.3.2 Industry Structure 
As noted, a bicycle drivetrain consists of six complementary components – shifters, 
derailleurs, freewheels, chains, hubs, and brake shifters.  These components define the 
boundaries of the industry.  Following Grove (1996) and Fransman (2002) the industry can be 
represented as a set of layers, one for each component.  We construct two proxy measures to 
determine changes in the competitive dynamics within and across these layers.  As our first 
measure we use a modified Herfindahl-Index to measure industry concentration within each of 
the six layers (one for each component).  The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of all firms’ 
market shares squared.  The index can take on values between 0 and 10,000.  The more 
competitors are in a market and the more evenly distributed their market shares are, the lower the 
Herfindahl index.  Since direct market share data was unavailable we constructed a proxy to 
measure industry concentration as follows: We counted all bicycle models offered in any given 
year.  Next, we counted the number of bicycle models for which an individual firm supplied its 
                                                                                                                                                             
specifying the relations between technical characteristics (the components) and service characteristics (product 
attributes)” (Murmann and Frenken, 2006:941) is very similar to our mapping of one of the two product 
architecture dimensions: the function-component allocation scheme.  Nevertheless, Murmann and Frenken use 
their matrix to search for components with high pleiotropy (a component exhibits high pleiotropy if it affects many 
functions) as they identify those as the defining elements for dominant designs.  In contrast, we use our product 
architecture assessment strictly to describe product architecture changes over time, and we do not claim it to 
identify dominant designs per se.  In addition, Murmann and Frenken’s approach of dominant design definition 
differs also from our approach of product architecture assessment in that they permit interfaces to constitute 
components, because their focus is on high-pleiotropy elements, and these elements can be either true components 
or interfaces, whereas we strictly distinguish components and interfaces in our analysis. 
7 For example, for some scholars a dominant design is determined through socio-cognitive sense-making processes 
between market participants (Rosa et al., 1999).  Seen from this perspective, a product design can become (or 
recede to be) a dominant design without actual changes in its technical parameters. 
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components.  We define the fraction of models for which a firm supplies its components as our 
proxy for market share within its segment.8   
Our second measure assesses concentration across the segments; we call it the integration 
distribution. It consists of six market share indices and is defined as follows.  Each bicycle model 
has one of each of the six components.  If all six components are supplied by one firm, we label 
this model a ‘type 1’ bicycle.  If two firms share the supply of the six components, the model is a 
‘type 2’ bicycle, and so on.  At the other end of the spectrum, if six different firms supply one 
component each, we classify the model as a ‘type 6’ bicycle.  The market share index of each 
type can vary between 0% and 100%.  The set of the six indices, i.e., the integration distribution, 
reflects the concentration of firms across the component segments.  It is most closely akin to the 
vertical integration measure in sequential supply chains.  Similar to the product architecture 
measurements, we measure the two industry structure proxies at four points in our observation 
period (t-1=1980, t0=1985, t1=1988, and t2=1990).  In the appendix, we also provide layer maps 
of the industry, that show the market share for each of the three largest firms (and a fourth group 
labeled ‘others’) for every component segment in every year over our observation period.9 
 
3 ANALYSIS: THE BICYCLE DRIVETRAIN COMPONENT INDUSTRY 1980-1990 
Table 4 summarizes our measurements of product architectures and industry structures.  It 
presents in the top half the data from the product architecture domain and in the bottom half the 
                                                 
8 We are aware that this is not a true market share measure, neither in sold units nor in monetary value.  However, 
given the large number of models in our Super Spec Database (SSD) and the dramatic changes our data show, we 
believe it is a useful approximation of changes in the competitive landscape in this industry.  Furthermore, other 
researchers have used this data source in a similar way.  For instance, Fine (1998:56ff), discussing Shimano’s 
market power, uses the SSD and states that “In Bicycling magazine’s Super Spec Database of over a thousand 
1993 models, 86 percent of the bicycles came with Shimano components.” 
9 While our layer maps look similar to Grove’s (1996:40-44), ours are narrower in industry definition since they 
include exclusively technical components.   
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data from the industry structure domain.  Within the product architecture portion the top row 
represents the product architecture of Shimano, the bottom row the rest-of-the-industry.  Each 
architecture assessment comprises the two function-component allocation indices and three 
interface characteristics.  Within the industry structure domain, the top portion shows the within 
layer concentration, the bottom portion the across layer concentration. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------- 
3.1 1980-1984 
In the early 1980s the standard bicycle drivetrain product architecture was almost perfectly 
modular.  As discussed above we find that in 1980 the components related to ‘power 
transmission,’ ‘gear shifting,’ and ‘brake actuation’ showed a relatively low level of integrality 
with respect to their function-component allocation (low values in column t-1=1980 for 
component count and entanglement indices in Table 4), and the interface assessment produces 
modest values for interface strength and irreversibility, and high values for interface 
standardization.  Note that the product architecture assessments for Shimano and the rest of the 
industry produce identical results.  In all, during this phase inter-firm component compatibility 
was very high, and most bicycles were sold with a mix of components from various firms.   
The structure of the industry in the early 1980s was fairly heterogeneous and competitive 
within each segment as well as across the segments.  In 1984, over 50 firms were supplying 
drivetrain components for road bicycles (RB) and over 25 for mountain bicycles (MTB).  The 
RB drivetrain industry had three major contenders and many small companies: Shimano, 
SunTour, and Campagnolo were the leaders in most drivetrain component markets (layers), with 
SunTour being slightly ahead of the other two (for details see Appendix Fig A.1.0 and Fig 
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A.1.1)(Berto, 2005).  Shimano and SunTour produced components in all six layers but their 
market shares varied across layers; between 12% and 20% for Shimano, and between 5% and 
40% for SunTour.  Campagnolo focused on shifters, derailleurs, and hubs, and purchased most of 
its freewheels and chains from component firms such as Regina or Maillard.  Despite the 
leadership of these three firms, overall market concentration was relatively low, and varied 
substantially from layer to layer.  The model-weighted Herfindahl indices for the RB market for 
this time period ranged from 1,000 (hubs) to 2,870 (derailleurs).  Similarly, market share of 
integrated systems was very low.  In 1984, only 5.6% of the new RBs introduced came with all 
six drivetrain components provided by a single supplier (‘Type 1’).  Over 50% of the new 
models had their six drivetrain components supplied by four, five, or six different firms 
The MTB market was small in the early 1980s.  In 1983, MTBs represented only 6.7 % of 
the U.S. bicycle market (Bicycling magazine), Aug 1983:54).  The early assemblers of MTBs 
such as Breeze, Fisher, and Ritchey used an eclectic mixture of components – including some 
motorcycle parts – for their drivetrains (Berto, 1998; Bicycling magazine) Aug 1983:54-57).  
SunTour and Shimano realized that components suitable for mountain biking had to be more 
robust than conventional road racing-type components, and developed a line of products tailored 
to the needs of this emerging market.  In particular, they redesigned gear shifters so that they 
could be comfortably positioned next to the thumb on the handlebars (Far Eastern Economic 
Review) Dec 14 1989: p103).  In 1982, SunTour introduced its Component Ensemble (Berto, 
1998), and Shimano launched its Deore drivetrain set which was designed for the use in 
mountain bicycles (Bicycling magazine) May 1982:88).  Both Shimano and SunTour entered the 
MTB market earlier than other major component firms and led the MTB component 
development during this phase, with a slight advantage for SunTour (Berto, 2005). 
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3.2 1985-1987 
Prior to 1985, most bicycles’ gear-shifting systems required the rider to carefully adjust the 
shift lever when switching gears.  That changed in 1985 when Shimano introduced its index-
shifting technology (Shimano Index System: S.I.S.).  With S.I.S., preset positions signaled gear 
engagement with a ‘click’ that the bicycle rider could hear and feel.  With each click of the 
shifter the rear derailleur aligned the chain precisely with one of the evenly spaced sprockets on a 
freewheel or cassette (Bicycling magazine), Feb 1986:154).   
To develop S.I.S. Shimano had to redesign four relevant components – shifter, derailleur, 
freewheel, and chain – and change the linkages between them.  In the process, it made the 
product architecture of this set of components more integral.  Table 4 makes the details of this 
architectural change visible.  In the function-component allocation the component count and 
entanglement measures went up for both ‘power transmission’ and particularly ‘gear shifting.’  
Of the interface characteristics, strength increased slightly due to somewhat higher precision 
requirements, and irreversibility did not change because the firms still used the same type of 
fastening technologies.  But standardization declined dramatically because compatibility was 
eliminated between the components of the S.I.S. architecture and the components of the rest of 
the industry.   
With the exception of the standardization measure, the changes only affected Shimano’s 
product architecture.  Note, however, that a move towards integrality by one firm, decreases the 
standardization measure of the industry because this measure indicates the size of the population 
of compatible components. 
In 1985 the markets for bicycle drivetrain components were still fairly competitive.  The 
within-segment concentration indices varied across segments between 1,150 and 2,700 for RBs, 
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and between 1,310 and 4,350 for MTBs.  Only 13.4% of RBs and 7.0% of MTBs came with all 
six drivetrain components made by one supplier (column t0=1985 in Table 4).  
Shimano introduced the new index shifting set first to its top RB line Dura-Ace in 1985, 
then to its moderately priced 600 group in 1986 (Bicycling magazine), Mar 1987:38), and last to 
its low priced 105 line in 1987.  Once S.I.S. was added to all Shimano drive-train sets, none of 
the four components in its set was compatible with other components made by other firms.  
Responding to Shimano’s success with its new index shifting architecture – from 1985 to 1986 
the S.I.S. architecture’s RB market share grew from 3% to 23% (Fig A.1.2 and A.1.3) – the main 
competitors SunTour, Campagnolo, and Sachs/Huret developed their own versions of index 
shifting.  SunTour introduced its index system AccuShift in 1986 (Fig A.1.3), Campagnolo 
introduced its own version of an index shifting system, Syncro, to the market in 1987 (Fig. 
A.1.4), and Sachs/Huret also entered the index shifting market with its own solution, ARIS, at 
the end of 1987 (Fig. A.1.4).  All these indexed shifting systems had become integral and 
required specialized components that were no longer compatible across firms.  Over the next few 
years, all major firms phased out the production of most of their compatible components 
(represented by market share that falls outside of the solid-lined boxes in the graphs in the 
Appendix). 
Note that the function-component allocation of Shimano’s product architecture does not 
change from t0=1985 to t1=1988, but it does for the rest of the industry.  In fact, by 1988 the 
measurements for the rest of the industry approach those of Shimano.  The same is true for the 
measurements of interface strength (minor change) and interface irreversibility (no change).  An 
exception is again the measurement of the interface standardization as a consequence of the shift 
in market shares of the now incompatible product architectures. 
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Although initially introduced in the RB market, the index shifting systems changed the MTB 
market at a much faster rate.  In addition, the MTB market itself grew substantially.  By 1988, 
the fraction of bicycles that were MTBs had grown to 40%.  Shimano and SunTour had been 
major players in the MTB market since the early 1980s, and both transferred their index shifting 
systems with their integral product architectures from RBs to MTBs starting in 1987 (Fig A.2.4).  
And throughout the second half of the 1980s Shimano and SunTour were in fierce competition 
with each other in this sector.  However, even though both firms offered similar product lines, 
Shimano’s market share leadership grew with every year.  By 1988, Shimano held 77% of MTB 
market share with S.I.S. compared to 14% that SunTour held with Accushift. 
In the second half of the 1980s the industry structure also began to change substantially.  By 
1988, the Herfindahl indices increased dramatically (in some cases doubled) to a range between 
2,400 and 4,420 for RBs, and between 3,060 and 7,620 for MTBs.  Similarly, the fraction of 
bicycles that were outfitted with components from a single firm became the mode, with 38.8% 
for RBs, and 46.8% for MTBs. 
3.3 1988-1990 
In 1989, Shimano took its product architecture integration one step further.  In the MTB 
market segment it introduced its HyperGlide (HG) freewheel, which allowed bike riders to 
change gears under load while pedaling, even when shifting from a smaller to a larger sprocket 
(Bicycling magazine), Sep 1988:8, Dec 1989:96).  The HG freewheel had to be keyed to the hub, 
thus the components could only be assembled in one alignment (Berto, 2005:298).  Thus, 
Shimano brought an additional component (the hub) into its already integral drive train system 
and, as a result, further reduced the components’ compatibility with either Shimano’s other 
components (that were soon phased out) or those of other firms.  This effect can be seen in an 
increase in standardization for Shimano and a decrease of standardization for the rest of the 
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industry – due to shrinking population size of alternatives for their components.  From 1988 to 
1990 the assessment of the industry leader’s function-component allocation scheme increases 
further for the function gear shifting.  With the exception of the interface standardization all 
other product architecture measures remained unaffected. 
By 1990 the MTB market was larger than the RB market.  Only three integral product 
architectures existed in the 1989 MTB market: S.I.S. plus HG, and S.I.S., both from Shimano, 
and AccuShift from SunTour (Fig. A.2.6).  At this point, the direction of technology transfer had 
also reversed: Shimano offered its HG freewheel for road bicycles in 1990, and SunTour and 
Campagnolo followed by introducing their versions of HyperGlide to road bicycles.   
The end of the decade is characterized by a stark industry consolidation and the market 
dominance of Shimano.  While the pace of industry concentration within the layers slowed down 
and approached similar levels across the layers – the Herfindahl indices in 1990 ranged from 
4,150 to 4,220 for RBs and from 6,380 to 6,790 for MTBs – the distribution of integration 
indices signals a strong concentration.  In both RB and MTB markets over 90% of the bicycles 
are now equipped with all six drivetrain components made by a single firm (column t2=1990 in 
Table 4).  This increase in industry concentration coincides with the emerging dominance of a 
single firm.  Over the relatively short period of six years Shimano became the dominant firm in 
both RB and MTB drivetrain market sectors.  In 1990, Shimano’s market shares in each of the 
six segments reached over 55% in the RB category, and almost 80% in the MTB category. 
 
4 HOW PRIOR THEORY EXPLAINS THE EVENTS 
To explore how existing theory would explain the observed events, we return to our research 
framework (Figure 2).  Using the letter system in the framework, we will compare the events 
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with the predictions offered by existing theory.  We separate the analysis below into two 
segments: change description and explanation of cause-effect relationships. 
4.1 Descriptions of Product Architecture and Industry Structure Changes 
4.1.1 Product Architecture Changes 
The majority of the extant literature predicts a trend towards increasing levels of 
modularization (towards PA1).  Some scholars, however, recognize the possibility of a reverse 
movement towards higher degrees on integrality (towards PA2).  Their descriptions vary in the 
extent of the movement and in the level of detail of the change path.  For example, in his double-
helix model Fine (1998) describes product architectures as oscillating between integral and 
modular states.  Conceptually similar, Schilling (2000) allows systems to migrate towards and 
away from modularity.  The two concepts differ in that Fine seems to imply a series of full 
swings between the endpoints whereas Schilling allows small shifts as well as equilibria 
anywhere on the spectrum.  Christensen et al. (2002), focusing on the interfaces as their unit-of-
analysis, distinguish between modular and interdependent interfaces and suggest that while the 
migration is mostly towards more modular interfaces, under some circumstances the process can 
reverse its direction.  How far it can go in the new direction remains unspecified.  Henderson and 
Clark (1990) identify the introduction of a new product architecture as an architectural 
innovation.  They are silent, however, on whether this shift introduces an architecture that is 
more modular or more integral than its predecessor. 
In our case, the direction of product architecture change is clearly towards higher levels of 
integrality given that our measurement is anchored at perfect modularity.  Since our measure has 
no equivalent anchor for perfect integrality, however, we cannot say how big the shift was 
relative to the conceptual extreme.  What we can say is that the change process proceeded in 
steps both for the innovating firm and across the industry, and that this form of change process 
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caused temporary product architecture heterogeneity across firms.  The second detail that our 
analysis allows to add is that some dimensions of the product architecture changed but not all of 
them.  Our fine-grained description of product architecture change will help in identifying cause-
effect relationships below. 
4.1.2 Industry Structure Changes 
Similar to the majority opinion on product architecture migration, most scholars describe the 
prevalent change in industry structure more towards disintegration and specialization.  The 
prevailing findings are that industries begin in an integrated mode and become disintegrated over 
time.  This effect has been observed in industries as different as computers (Baldwin and Clark, 
2000), text books (Schilling, 2000), and mortgage banking (Jacobides, 2005).  This general 
direction of industry evolution has been explained by the increasing efficiency through the 
division of labor that is only limited by the extent of the market (Stigler, 1951), first formulated 
by Adam Smith over 200 years ago.  Providing firm-level explanations, Jacobides (2005) 
identifies potential gains from specialization and gains from trade as underlying forces that 
ultimately cause an industry’s disintegration.  Proponents for the opposing view, i.e., that 
industries can integrate, are fewer.  Chandler (1977) finds increasing vertical integration in his 
studies of large American corporations, and explains this trend with an increasing need for 
administration through growing markets and increasingly complex technologies.  In an effort to 
reconcile Chandler’s and Smith’s views, Langlois (2003) suggests that Chandler’s findings of 
vertical integration are a temporary phenomenon that industries experience on their way to 
vertical disintegration.  Yet others have suggested that industries oscillate between integrated and 
disintegrated forms of their structure (Fine, 1998), and neither form is ultimately stable.  Some 
empirical studies support this possibility.  For example, in their study of the chemical industry 
Macher and Mowery (2004) find that after disintegrating, the industry split into a commodity 
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segment and a specialty segment, and firms in the latter began to re-integrate.  Similarly, 
Jacobides and Winter (2005) show how the watch industry re-integrated after the introduction of 
the quartz movement technology. 
More generally, there seems to be a two-level debate ongoing.  At the macro level, focusing 
more on long-term historical dimensions, the agreement appears to be that industries ultimately 
migrate towards higher degrees of specialization, while at the micro level possibilities are 
considered for short-term and medium-term industry changes in either direction.  It is the latter 
that we necessarily focus on with our case study over only ten years.  One question within the 
micro level is the sequence of changes in an industry.  It has been suggested that firms, first, gain 
dominance in their segment, and then, second, begin to vertically integrate (Fine, 1998).  Our 
case with its narrow focus on six parallel layers clearly demonstrates the reverse sequence of 
change events.  Shimano not only produced all six segments at the beginning of our observation 
period, but, more importantly, it introduced an integrated design before it began its expansion of 
market share in all individual segments. 
4.2 Cause-Effect Relationships 
To explore whether existing theories can explain the observed events, we first describe the 
cause-effect relationships of these theories within our framework (Figure 2), and then compare 
and contrast them to the cause-effect relationships that we observed in our case study.  Each 
chain of causes and effects will cover the path of change, the underlying mechanisms at work, 
and the drivers behind the change. 
In their seminal work on the evolution of the computer industry, Baldwin and Clark (2000) 
describe the initial creation of the modular architecture as clearly preceding the emergence of the 
modular industry structure, ‘industry clusters’ in their parlance.  This corresponds to a path of 
first (b) and then (a) in our framework.  The mechanisms at work they describe as a set of six 
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modular operators: splitting, substitution, augmenting, excluding, inverting, and porting.  The 
drivers in Baldwin and Clark’s theory are the designers.  “Designers see and seek value in new 
designs.” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000:35)  Although their theory focuses on creating modular 
designs, they do acknowledge that designers see design parameter interdependencies, and 
consider those in their designs.  They also assert that a modularization (splitting) requires the 
designers’ knowledge about interdependencies to reach or exceed a certain threshold – one that 
allows design rules to be established without unduly constraining the performance of the artifact. 
Schilling (2000), in her model on explaining interfirm product modularity spends little time 
on describing a path of events between product architectures and industry architectures.  At the 
heart of her model is the assumption that a product or system attempts to achieve a best fit with 
its environment by migrating towards or away from modularity.  While the model allows for 
system’s inertia and firms’ resistance against change, at its core it assumes that the balance of 
external forces determines the system’s degree of modularity.  Eleven propositions describe the 
forces that drive the system towards or away from higher levels of modularity.  The greater the 
functionality achieved through component specificity (P1), the greater the difficulty for 
customers to assess component quality and interaction (P2), and the greater the difficulty for 
customers to assemble the system (P3), the lower the degree of interfirm product modularity.  
The next three propositions suggest that heterogeneity of inputs increases interfirm product 
modularity through greater differentials of capabilities among firms (P4), greater diversity in 
technological options (P5), and the interaction of the capability differentials and technological 
option diversity (P6).  These forces and increasing interfirm product modularity may over time 
become a self-reinforcing cycle (P7).  Demand heterogeneity will also cause an increase in 
interfirm product modularity (P8), and the heterogeneity of inputs and demands will each 
reinforce the effect of the other (P9).  Finally, the speed of technological change (P10) and 
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competitive intensity (P11) will accelerate any existing migration towards or away from higher 
levels of interfirm product modularity.  In summary, these forces are the drivers of product 
architecture change, and the type of pressure they generate represents the mechanisms.  Only the 
forces of propositions 4, 6 and 11 suggest a path from industry to architecture (either (a) or (c)), 
all others fall in the non-industry causes category (either (e) or (f)). 
Fine (1998) in his double-helix model describes the changes of product architecture and 
industry structure as jointly occurring, i.e., (a) and (b), or (c) and (d) happen simultaneously.  
Instead of the sequence, he focuses more on the mechanisms and drivers that force these 
changes.  For the change towards modularity he identifies advantages of niche competitors, 
disadvantages of covering broad knowledge fields, and organizational rigidities of large firms as 
drivers, the first one represents change path (a), the latter two represent change path (b) in our 
framework.  For the change towards integrality he suggests the forces of technical advances, 
individual firms’ market power in individual component markets, and potential profitability from 
integration into a proprietary system.  The first and third forces reflect external change paths (f) 
and (h) respectively, whereas the second force can be understood as change path (c). 
Christensen et al. (2002) also discuss the possibility of a change process towards higher 
degrees of integration.  Their starting point is “the occurrence of a ‘performance gap’–an upward 
shift in functionality that customers needed” (Christensen et al., 2002:972), which can be 
satisfied only by technically integral solutions.  This, in turn, favors vertically integrated firms 
over modular ones.  From the perspective of our framework, external demands (f) cause the 
product architecture to become integral, and selection pressures (c) then changes the population 
of product architectures in an industry. 
Similar to Christensen et al., Jacobides and Winter (2005) incorporate in their framework 
the possibility that industries can migrate towards higher degrees of integration.  Where they 
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differ from Christensen et al. is the origin, i.e., the driver of the process.  Jacobides and Winter 
(2005:405) argue “ .. that the cycle pushing toward specialization gets reversed when new and 
superior capabilities arise from knowledge bases that are misaligned with the existing vertical 
structure of the industry.”  In the language of our framework the arrival of new and superior 
capabilities is represented by link (f), the new superior design by link (d), and the ensuing 
selection pressures by link (c).  As support they present the case of the Swiss Watch 
manufacturing industry, which was unable to respond to the introduction of the quartz watch 
movement.  While their case exhibits some similarity to our bicycle drivetrain component case 
with respect to change direction and effects, it differs in the origin of the innovation and the 
degree to which it was radical.   
Langlois (2003; 2004), in his work to reconcile the views of Smith and Chandler, similarly 
proposes that external technical change can cause firms to re-integrate.  His fundamental 
argument is that these external technical changes open up new opportunities, but at the same time 
temporarily increase what he calls ‘dynamic transaction costs,’ i.e., the cost of “informing 
outsiders and persuading them to cooperate in production” (Langlois, 2006:1400).  In those 
circumstances, the expansion of a firm’s boundaries then is the most economic choice.   Within 
our framework, the linkages are similar to the ones at Jacobides and Winter: the need to lower 
dynamic transaction costs through integral solutions is represented by link (f), the new superior 
solution by link (d), and the ensuing selection pressures by link (c).   
Finally, Brusoni et al. (2001) also emphasize the value for a firm of maintaining an 
integrated knowledge perspective.  However, there is a subtle difference to Jacobides and 
Winter’s and Langlois’s approach.  Whereas both Jacobides and Winter and Langlois see the 
arrival of new knowledge that is misaligned with current capabilities as the driver for change on 
a systemic level, Brusoni et al. view the integrated knowledge perspective as the mechanism 
- 28 - 
with which a firm can cope better with technology progress that is uneven across components.  
In our framework, the increasing degree of integration on the knowledge level then is a cause 
that is not industry structure-related (f), and its consequences are superior designs (d), and 
selection pressure (c). 
A close inspection of our case study reveals the following cause-effect relationships.  
Starting with the general product architecture in the industry being modular, and the industry 
structure disintegrated, one firm introduced an integral product architecture (f).  This linkage is 
similar to Baldwin and Clark’s designer seeking value (although in our case they were not 
seeking option value but rather the value of systemic performance), Schilling’s increase in 
synergistic specificity, and Fine’s technical advances.  It differs somewhat from the accounts of 
Christensen et al., Jacobides and Winter, Langlois, and Brusoni et al. who all see the integration 
rather as a response to changes in either customer demand or technological environments to 
lower transaction costs, as opposed to a deliberate strategic move of one industry participant. 
The second cause-effect linkage that we can identify in our case is the effect the new and 
superior integral product architecture had on the industry: it pushed the entire industry to become 
more integrated (d).  This happened because the superior performance was only possible through 
the integral design solution, hence, competition forced all firms to play on the new field.  From 
the perspective of the non-leading firms this is represented by link (c).  This link however, looks 
on the inside very different for firms that are already integrated compared to those that are not.  
We will explain the theoretical underpinnings in the next section. 
Finally, we investigate for our case study the effects of supporting activities for the industry 
structure change (linkage (h)).  We identify two reasons that appear to have played major 
supporting roles in Shimano’s success for starting to get the product architecture moving away 
from modularity.  The first was the timing of Shimano’s attack, i.e., its temporal context.  In the 
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mid-1980s, the mountain bicycle market began to emerge in the U.S.  When riding in rough 
terrain, it is particularly valuable to keep the hands on the handlebar at all times and focus on the 
path ahead.  Index shifting, together with repositioning the shifters to the handlebar, made that 
possible.  In other words, Shimano introduced its performance improvement through the integral 
product architecture at a point in time at which it became particularly relevant.  Shimano appears 
to have learned here from an episode a few years earlier: In the early 1980s, when Shimano 
launched an attempt to introduce incompatible component sets that were designed for better 
aerodynamics, most customers did not consider this new technology as added value and rejected 
it.  As a result, Shimano retreated and reverted back to interchangeable components. 
The second reason that helped Shimano to start the product architecture shift in the industry 
was support for the dealerships.  One of the side effects of Shimano’s new architecture was that 
it required new tools to disassemble and assemble the component sets.  The costs for the new 
tools and for learning how to use them represented switching costs for the bicycle repair shops, 
who also often sold new bicycles.  To lower those switching costs Shimano distributed the 
special tools free of charge to dealers (Bicycling magazine), Feb 1985:163-174), and sent 
technicians to dealers to teach them how to install and fix indexed component sets.  These 
activities made the distribution channels more comfortable with the technology and increased 
their willingness to carry bicycles with S.I.S. component sets.  In contrast, during the 
aerodynamics episode, Shimano had tried to force the dealers to purchase the special tools 
required to repair the aerodynamics component sets (Bicycling magazine), Feb 1982:66-96).  
That strategy contributed to the dealers’ unwillingness to carry Shimano’s aerodynamic 
component sets – another reason for the failure of the first attempt. 
We also studied the influence of marketing and pricing strategies as alternative explanations 
for the observed changes in industry composition.  While in general there are many different 
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marketing channels available for bicycle component firms, through interviews we found that a 
major marketing avenue in the 1980s was print ads in bicycling-related publications, in particular 
in Bicycling magazine.  To check whether the marketing activities differed substantially across 
the major firms we counted the number of pages each firm bought for advertisements in the 
Bicycling magazine.  The data does not allow us to discern a significant difference in marketing 
efforts across the three systems firms.  We also checked whether the three systems firms 
employed different pricing strategies.  The data we collected allows us to reject this hypothesis, 
too.  All through the decade all three major firms offered component sets across the price 
spectrum, albeit with Campagnolo leaning slightly to the high-price segments.   
The overall sequence of effects, i.e., that once a technology has demonstrated its superiority 
in the market, every competitor is forced to match the offer is supported by the theories of 
Christensen et al., Jacobides and Winter, Brusoni et al., and Langlois.  In contrast, Fine assumes 
first the market power by a player in a component segment before industry integration occurs, 
which is different from what we observe in our case.  All theories, however, assume simply that 
the competitive effects are similar for all industry participants. 
In summary, we identify three areas where we can contribute to the extant literature.  The 
first relates to the change path of product architectures, the second concerns the cause-effect 
relationships between changes in individual product architecture dimensions and their effects on 
competitors, and the third involves the origin of integral product architecture innovation. 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Theoretical Implications 
The first addition to the literature our case analysis permits us to make is the introduction of 
a new design operator.  Baldwin and Clark suggest that their list of operators – splitting, 
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substitution, augmenting, excluding, inverting, and porting – is complete to generate “ … any 
conceivable modular design or task structure … from a set of earlier structures via some 
sequence of operator steps.” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000:144)  We do not challenge that notion 
with respect to modular designs, but propose that their set of operators is incomplete for the 
creation of any design.  More specifically, we introduce integrating as a design operator to 
complement those suggested by Baldwin and Clark.  As the case data demonstrates, the changes 
in product architecture that Shimano introduced in 1985 clearly reduced the degree of modularity 
of the bicycle drivetrain component set.  Subsequently, the other firms in the industry followed 
Shimano’s lead and moved to more integral product architectures themselves.  While it is 
possible that product architectures migrate to more modular structures in the long-run, our case 
clearly shows that there is the possibility for an at least temporary reversal of this process. 
Our second contribution is concerned with the unpacking of some causal mechanisms 
between technical changes and changes in the industry architecture.  The introduction of our 
fine-grained and multi-dimensional product architecture measurement not only allowed us to 
identify specific product architecture change patterns, but – in conjunction with a careful 
industry definition – also permitted us to make visible the mechanisms through which changes of 
individual product architecture dimensions affect individual competitor categories.  In the 
bicycle drivetrain case three different mechanisms affected different types of competitors very 
differently (Figure 5).  The first, triggered by a more integral function-component allocation, 
increased the systemic performance and consequently forced the competitors who offered all of 
the six drivetrain components, i.e., systems firms, into a systems competition.  In contrast, the 
second mechanism, triggered by a reduction in interface standardization, drastically reduced the 
available market size of complementary components to which component firms could attach 
their own components.  With the elimination of interfirm component compatibility, the small 
- 32 - 
firms essentially lost the population of components that were ‘co-specialized’ with their own 
components.10  The third mechanism made the systemic form of competition difficult for all 
firms still standing because the origin of performance differentials was very difficult to detect, 
and it took the remaining competitors several years to close the performance gap. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
It has been shown before that individual product architecture dimensions are linked to 
multiple individual operational performance dimensions of a firm – such as cost and time 
(Fixson, 2006); our case here shows that there are equally intricate linkages between individual 
product architecture dimensions and multiple strategic performance dimensions of a firm.  Our 
case data illustrates two different effects on single-component and multi-component firms in a 
narrowly defined industry.  We conjecture that in industries defined with higher levels 
complexity additional cause-effect relationships are at work.   
The third contribution of our case analysis is to shed light on the origin of architectural 
innovations, and their underlying prerequisites.  Specifically, we propose that the firm boundary 
location is not only an outcome of efficiency considerations but can also be pre-condition for 
some types of innovations.   
Most current explanations of an industry’s structure explain firms’ boundary location 
choices as a consequence of efficiency considerations.  First, classic transaction cost and 
                                                 
10 A similar effect, i.e., the exclusion of rivals from upstream suppliers or downstream sellers, has been termed 
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complete contract analysis focuses on how information asymmetry and incentive problems can 
create hold-up problems (Williamson, 1985; Hart and Moore, 1990; Baker et al., 2002; Gibbons, 
2005).  The firm’s boundary choices are aimed at lowering total transaction costs.  Similarly, the 
more recent focus on mundane transactions also tends to focus on reducing transaction costs, 
albeit via the possible detour of first creating the capabilities that are necessary to reduce these 
dynamic transaction costs.  In other words, the goal is still to improve long-run process 
efficiencies by reducing transaction costs, but the skills to do so might be costly to acquire and 
build (Langlois, 2006).   
Another expansion of the classic view that resolving the incentive problem requires 
ownership (Teece, 1986) has been proposed by Jacobides et al. (2006).  They suggest viewing 
competition more systemically, i.e., to rethink existing business models, and to benefit through 
activities such as inducing competition in neighboring industry layers or investing in assets 
expected to appreciate through increasing competition.  For both of these literature streams, 
however, the transactional interface and the co-specialization of assets, respectively, are 
exogenously determined. 
In contrast, our case study suggests that the existence of a transactional interface, and the 
degree of co-specialization is to a large extent an endogenous variable.  Engineering decisions – 
particularly concerning product architecture – affect both the feasibility of transactions and the 
degree of co-specialization of assets and components.  Co-specialization can increase product 
performance as observed in our case.  Alternatively, process cost reductions may be achievable 
via the larger redesign of a product and its architecture (cf. Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004).  This 
                                                                                                                                                             
foreclosure in the economics literature (cf. (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007).   
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explanation is akin to Baldwin and Clark’s (Baldwin and Clark, 2008) with respect to the 
endogeneity of the location of transactional interfaces. 
Designer pursuing modularity ‘see and seek value’ in the options that a modular design 
generates.  Designers pursuing integral solutions seek value in a system setup that is – along 
some performance dimension – better than more modular setups.  Although the type of value 
premium is dissimilar, in both cases it is the designers that envision the solution space and set the 
ground rules of how to explore it.  Where then, does the competence to do so reside?  The 
analysis of our case data suggests that the competence for architectural redesign is more likely to 
exist in firms that cover a broader component spectrum.  In our case, both the attacking firm and 
all surviving firms were already in the business of making all relevant components.  Knowledge 
across several segments appears to have been a necessary ingredient for maintaining 
competitiveness in the wake of this architectural shift.  Broader scope apparently helped some 
firms avoid the ‘modularity trap’ (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 1999).  But broad scope was not 
necessarily sufficient as illustrated by how long it took the defenders to create their own 
competitive integral product architectures.  Paralleling Brusoni et al. (2001) who suggest that a 
broad knowledge base is required for system integrator firms to accommodate multiple 
technology advancement rates across multiple components, we add that the broad knowledge 
base can also be valuable for a firm in creating a new architecture in the first place.  In summary, 
we argue that a firm’s boundaries may not only be a consequence of efficiency considerations, 
but it can also be the origin – or at least pre-condition – of industry-altering architectural 
innovations. 
Overall, our study reveals that the cause-effect relationships between product architecture 
and industry structure were complex.  On the industry level, there was a strong cause-effect 
relationship from product architecture to industry structure.  One firm’s successful integral 
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product architecture forced all firms to become more integrated, albeit through three distinct 
mechanisms (shift to systemic performance, reduced interface standardization, and difficulty in 
understanding systemic performance).  However, on the individual firm’s level – especially at 
the beginning of the process – there is evidence of causality running the other way: from firm 
boundary to product architecture.  The firm that introduced the new integral architecture was a 
firm of broad vertical scope, and it had tried the integrating move before.  And the only survivors 
of the industry shakeout were firms of similarly broad scope. 
5.2 Managerial Implications 
Even if long-run product architecture developments tend to lead to increasing 
modularization, our case demonstrates that there can be tremendous value in temporary re-
integration.  The managerial implications following from this insight are twofold.  First, there is 
substantial value in understanding the potentially industry-changing power of product 
architecture innovation.  In other words, engineering decisions on product architecture are not 
only relevant for product performance and operational performance of the associated 
manufacturing system, but they also can have truly strategic value for the firm.  The devil, 
however, is in the details and knowing the effect propagation paths and mechanisms is a pre-
condition to align engineering and strategy.  Second, the necessary – albeit not sufficient – 
condition for creating product architecture innovations is knowledge that stretches at least across 
the current product portfolio, often beyond that.  This means that while a deep knowledge base 
has value for being able to compete within a modular architecture, to change the rules of the 
game requires investments in a broad knowledge base.  
Our case study yields some strategic advice for both attack and defense.  On the attacker’s 
side, it is valuable to know the conditions that facilitate architectural innovations because they 
have the potential to alter what Jacobides et al. (2006) have called the architecture of an industry 
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with strong repercussions for the other industry participants.  Most previous research has 
investigated architectural redesign decisions either in early-industry situations (e.g., IBM/360) or 
for firms that maintain architectural control (e.g., Microsoft over Windows).  Our case shows 
these effects at work in a mature industry in which no single firm controls the product 
architecture.  On the defender’s side, it is important to recognize hidden vulnerabilities of the 
own products due to their reliance on other co-specialized products.  Finally, knowing the paths 
through which changes in individual product architecture dimensions propagate through the 
industry is valuable knowledge for both attackers and defenders. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
We have analyzed a somewhat unusual case in which decreasing modularity in a mature and 
modular industry led to an overwhelming dominance of the attacking firm.  Our case shows how 
the introduction of an integral architecture by a then non-dominating firm resulted in a near-
monopoly position for the innovating firm within a few years.  Changes in two dimensions of the 
product architecture triggered effects in two different propagation paths, one hitting small 
component firms, the other larger systems firms.  While some supporting activities such as dealer 
training and free tools were relevant to set the process in motion, the analysis shows a clear link 
between technological change and industry structure with causality running from the former to 
the latter. 
There are two main limitations of our study.  The most obvious is that it is a single case 
study focusing on only one industry.  Generalizations beyond this industry are challenging.  
Nevertheless, previous single-industry studies on the effects of technical changes on competition 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990; Christensen, 1992a; Christensen, 1992b; Tripsas, 1997) have 
contributed helpful insights, and we hope to add to this body of knowledge with our study.  A 
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second limitation involves – as in any empirical study – the quality of the measurement 
instruments.  For both of our main dimensions, product architecture and industry structure, we 
constructed proxies to measure the change over time of the underlying constructs.  Our measures 
are certainly imperfect and we acknowledge potential distortions this may cause.  However, 
given the overwhelming change that our data indicates, we believe the analysis still provides 
interesting insights into the powerful effects product architecture choices can have on 
competitive outcomes.   
An interesting direction to extend this research would be to investigate product architecture 
changes and their consequences in larger, more complex supply networks.  Many studies do not 
distinguish clearly between vertical, horizontal, or sequential industry structures.  In this study 
we deliberately focused on a rather horizontal industry structure of limited size in order to isolate 
product architecture effects caused by the integration of components on the same product 
hierarchy level.  On the other hand, it has been suggested that in a vertical industry the profits 
flow away from modular sectors to the next level that is more integral (Christensen et al., 2001), 
and some empirical studies indicate that a firm boundary shift, caused by a product architecture 
change, might occur in one direction within a OEM – first-tier supplier relationship, but not at all 
or even in the reverse direction within the relationship between first-tier and second-tier 
suppliers, i.e., in the dyad below (Fixson et al., 2005).  This suggests that industry structure 
changes are not homogenous along a supply chain, just as product architecture changes are not 
likely to be homogenous within the product hierarchy.  Future research should address these 
complex relationships, perhaps by combining it with better industry structure measurements for 
complex industries (Dalziel, 2007).   
 
7 REFERENCES 
Abernathy, W. J., Utterback, J. M., 1978. Patterns of Industrial Innovation. Technology Review, 
MIT. 59-64. 
Anderson, P., Tushman, M. L., 1990. Technological Discontinuities and Dominant Designs: A 
Cyclical Model of Technological Change. Administrative Science Quarterly. 35, 604-633. 
Baker, G., Gibbons, R., Murphy, K. J., 2002. Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117, 39-84. 
Baldwin, C. Y., Clark, K. B., 2000. Design Rules. Volume 1: The Power of Modularity. MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Baldwin, C. Y., Clark, K. B., 2008. Where do transactions come from? Modularity, transactions, 
and the boundaries of firms. Industrial and Corporate Change. 17, 1, 155-195. 
Berto, F., 1998. Sunset for SunTour. 9th International Cycling History Conference, Vol. 9, pp. 
116-140. 
Berto, F., 2005. The Dancing Chain: History and Development of the Derailleur Bicycle. Van 
der Plas Publishing, San Francisco. 
Bicycling magazine, various issues: 1980-1990. 
Bijker, W. E., 1995. Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs - Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical 
Change. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A., Pavitt, K., 2001. Knowledge specialization, organizational coupling, 
and the boundaries of the firm: Why do firms know more than they make? Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 46, 4, 597-621. 
Carlile, P. R., Christensen, C. M., 2005. The Cycles of Theory Building in Management 
Research. Boston University - School of Management. Working Paper #2005-03, Boston. 
Chandler, A. D., 1977. The visible hand : the managerial revolution in American business. 
Harvard University Press. 
Chesbrough, H. W., Kusunoki, K., 1999. The Modularity Trap: Innovation, Technology Phase 
Shifts, and the Resulting Limits of Virtual Organizations. In: I. Nonaka, D. J. Teece, Eds.), 
Managing Industrial Knowledge - Creation, Transfer and Utilization. SAGE Publications, 
London, pp. 202-230. 
Christensen, C. M., 1992a. Exploring the limits of the technology S-curve. Part I: Component 
Technologies. Production and Operations Management. 1, 4, 334-357. 
Christensen, C. M., 1992b. Exploring the limits of the technology S-curve. Part II: Architectural 
Technologies. Production and Operations Management. 1, 4, 358-366. 
- 39 - 
Christensen, C. M., Raynor, M. E., Verlinden, M., 2001. Skate to Where the Money Will Be. 
Harvard Business Review. 79, November, 73-81. 
Christensen, C. M., Verlinden, M., Westerman, G., 2002. Disruption, disintegration and the 
dissipation of differentiability. Industrial and Corporate Change. 11, 5, 955-993. 
Cooper, R., Slagmulder, R., 2004. Interorganizational cost management and relational context. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society. 29, 1-26. 
Crawley, E. F., De Weck, O., Eppinger, S. D., Magee, C., Moses, J., Seering, W., Schindall, J., 
Wallace, D., Whitney, D. E., 2004. The Influence of Architecture in Engineering Systems. 
Engineering Systems Monograph, Vol. 2006. Engineering Systems Division, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA. 
Dalziel, M., 2007. A systems-based approach to industry classification. Research Policy. 36, 10, 
1559-1574. 
Duray, R., Ward, P. T., Milligan, G. W., Berry, W. L., 2000. Approaches to mass customization: 
configurations and empirical validation. Journal of Operations Management. 18, 605-625. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989. Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of 
Management Review. 14, 4, 532-550. 
Far Eastern Economic Review, various issues: 1980-1990. 
Fine, C. H., 1998. Clockspeed - Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage. 
Perseus Books, Reading, Massachusetts. 
Fixson, S. K., 2005. Product Architecture Assessment: A Tool to link Product, Process, and 
Supply Chain Design Decisions. Journal of Operations Management. 23, 3/4, 345-369. 
Fixson, S. K., 2006. A Roadmap for Product Architecture Costing. In: T. W. Simpson, et al., 
Eds.), Product Platform and Product Family Design: Methods and Applications. Springer, 
New York, pp. 305-333. 
Fixson, S. K., 2007. Modularity and Commonality Research: Past Developments and Future 
Opportunities. Concurrent Engineering: Research and Applications. 15, 2, 85-111. 
Fixson, S. K., Ro, Y., Liker, J. K., 2005. Modularization and Outsourcing: Who drives whom? - 
A Study of Generational Sequences in the U.S. Automotive Cockpit Industry. International 
Journal of Automotive Technology and Management. 5, 2, 166-183. 
Fransman, M., 2002. Mapping the evolving telecoms industry: the uses and shortcomings of the 
layer model. Telecommunications Policy. 26, 473-483. 
Fujita, K., Yoshida, H., 2004. Product Variety Optimization Simultaneously Designing Module 
Combination and Module Attributes. Concurrent Engineering: Research and Applications. 
12, 2, 105-118. 
- 40 - 
Gibbons, R., 2005. Four formal(izable) theories of the firm? Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization. 58, 200-245. 
Grove, A. S., 1996. Only the Paranoid Survive - How to Exploit the Crisis Points that challenge 
every Company and Career. Doubleday, New York. 
Hart, O., Moore, J., 1990. Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm. Journal of Political 
Economy. 98, 6, 1119-1158. 
Henderson, R. M., Clark, K. B., 1990. Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing 
Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms. Administrative Science 
Quarterly. 35, 9-30. 
Jacobides, M. G., 2005. Industry Change through Vertical Disintegration: How and Why 
Markets Emerged in Mortgage Banking. Academy of Management Journal. 48, 3, 465-498. 
Jacobides, M. G., Knudsen, T., Augier, M., 2006. Benefiting from innovation: Value creation, 
value appropriation and the role of industry architectures. Research Policy. 35, 1200-1221. 
Jacobides, M. G., Winter, S. G., 2005. The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and Transaction Costs: 
Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production. Strategic Management Journal. 26, 
395-413. 
Lafontaine, F., Slade, M., 2007. Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence. 
Journal of Economic Literature. XLV, 629-685. 
Langlois, R. N., 2002. Modularity in technology and organization. Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization. 49, 1, 19-37. 
Langlois, R. N., 2003. The vanishing hand: the changing dynamics of industrial capitalism. 
Industrial and Corporate Change. 12, 2, 351-385. 
Langlois, R. N., 2004. Chandler in a Larger Frame: Markets, Transactions Costs, and 
Organizational Form in History. Enterprise & Society. 5, 3, 355-375. 
Langlois, R. N., 2006. The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs. Organization Studies. 27, 
9, 1389-1410. 
MacCormack, A., Rusnak, J., Baldwin, C. Y., 2006. Exploring the Structure of Complex 
Software Designs: An Empirical Study of Open Source and Proprietary Code. Management 
Science. 52, 7, 1015-1030. 
Macher, J. T., Mowery, D. C., 2004. Vertical Specialization and Industry Structure in High 
Technology Industries. In: J. A. C. Baum, A. McGahan, Eds.), Advances in Strategic 
Management. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 317-355. 
Murmann, J. P., Frenken, K., 2006. Toward a systematic framework for research on dominant 
designs, technological innovations, and industrial change. Research Policy. 35, 925-952. 
- 41 - 
Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Nelson, S. A. I., Parkinson, M. B., Papalambros, P. Y., 2001. Multicriteria Optimization in 
Product Platform Design. Journal of Mechanical Design. 123, June, 199-204. 
Pettigrew, A. M., 1990. Longitudinal Field Research on Change: Theory and Practice. 
Organization Science. 1, 3, 267-292. 
Pimmler, T. U., Eppinger, S. D., 1994. Integration Analysis of Product Decompositions. 
unpublished Working Paper. MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA, pp. 39. 
Poole, M. S., Van de Ven, A. H., Dooley, K., Holmes, M. E., 2000. Organizational Change and 
Innovation Processes - Theory and Methods for Research. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford/New York. 
Rosa, J. A., Porac, J. F., Runser-Spanjol, J., Saxon, M. S., 1999. Sociocognitive Dynamics in a 
Product Market. Journal of Marketing. 63, Special Issue 1999, 64-77. 
Rosenberg, N., 1982. Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Sahal, D., 1981. Patterns of Technological Innovation. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 
Reading, Massachusetts. 
Sanchez, R., Mahoney, J. T., 1996. Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in 
Product and Organization Design. Strategic Management Journal. 17, Winter Special Issue, 
63-76. 
Schilling, M. A., 2000. Towards a general modular systems theory and its application to 
interfirm product modularity. Academy of Management Review. 25, 2, 312-334. 
Shibata, T., Yano, M., Kodama, F., 2005. Empirical analysis of evolution of product architecture 
- Fanuc numerical controllers from 1962 to 1997. Research Policy. 34, 13-31. 
Simpson, T. W., D'Souza, B. S., 2004. Assessing Variable Levels of Platform Commonality 
Within a Product Family Using a Multiobjective Genetic Algorithm. Concurrent 
Engineering: Research and Applications. 12, 2, 119-129. 
Stigler, G. J., 1951. The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market. Journal of 
Political Economy. 59, 3, 185-193. 
Sutherland, H., 1996. Sutherland's Handbook for Bicycle Mechanics. Sutherland Publications. 
Teece, D. J., 1986. Profiting from Technological Innovation - Implications for Integration, 
Collaboration, Licensing and Public-Policy. Research Policy. 15, 6, 285-305. 
- 42 - 
- 43 - 
Tripsas, M., 1997. Unraveling the process of creative destruction: Complementary assets and 
incumbent survival in the typesetter industry. Strategic Management Journal. 18, 119-142. 
Tu, Q., Vonderembse, M. A., Ragu-Nathan, T. S., Ragu-Nathan, B., 2004. Measuring 
Modularity-Based Manufacturing Practices and Their Impact on Mass Customization 
Capability: A Customer-Driven Perspective. Decision Sciences. 35, 2, 147-168. 
Tushman, M. L., Murmann, J. P., 1998. Dominant Designs, Technology Cycles, and 
Organizational Outcomes. Research in Organizational Behavior. 20, 231-266. 
Ulrich, K. T., 1995. The role of product architecture in the manufacturing firm. Research Policy. 
24, 419-440. 
Utterback, J. M., 1994. Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation. Harvard Business School Press, 
Boston, Massachusetts. 
Williamson, O. E., 1985. The economic institutions of capitalism: firms, markets, relational 
contracting. Free Press, New York. 
Wilson, D. G., 2004. Bicycling Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Worren, N., Moore, K., Cardona, P., 2002. Modularity, Strategic Flexibility, and Firm 
Performance: A Study of the Home Appliance Industry. Strategic Management Journal. 23, 
1123-1140. 
 
 
8 TABLES & FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Bicycle models offered in the U.S. between 1980 and 1990 
Category 1980* 1981* 1982* 1983* 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Road 5 12 27 18 215 134 143 134 147 179 346
MTB N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 43 48 59 94 134 369
Hybrids N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 58
Others N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 30
Total 5 12 27 18 215 177 191 193 241 313 803
Source: Superspec Database
Total Number of Bicycles offered in the U.S. 
* Bicycling Magazine began to annually publish its Superspec database (SSD) in 1984. Prior to that year it announced new 
bicycles individually in every issue. For the years 1980 to 1983 we counted all individual new bicycle annoucements and 
aggregated them for each year.  
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Table 2: Measuring function-component allocation (Shimano at t-1=1980) 
Product Architecture Shimano: t-1=1980
Dimension 1: Function-component allocation Components
1 2 3 4 5 6
Functions
Brake 
levers Shifter Derailleur
Free-
wheel Chain Hub
Component 
Count         
Index
Entanglement 
Index
1 Power transmission 1 1 1 3 1
2 Gear shifting 1 1 2 1
3 Brake actuation 1 1 1
Function count 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Table 3: Summary of product architecture assessment 
Functions Power Transm.
Gear 
Shifting
Brake 
Actuation
Component Count Index 3 2 1
Entanglement Index 1 1 1
Interface Characteristics
Strength 6 6 N/A
Irreversibility 5 4 N/A
Standardization 3,3 3,3 N/A
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Table 4: Changes of product architecture and industry structure in the bicycle drivetrain component industry, 1980-1990 
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Functions Power Transm.
Gear 
Shifting
Brake 
Actuation
Power 
Transm.
Gear 
Shifting
Brake 
Actuation
Power 
Transm.
Gear 
Shifting
Brake 
Actuation
Power 
Transm.
Gear 
Shifting
Brake 
Actuation
Component Count Index 3 2 1 3 4 1 3 4 1 3 5 1
Entanglement Index 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
Interface Characteristics
Strength 6 6 N/A 7 7 N/A 7 7 N/A 8 7 N/A
Irreversibility 5 4 N/A 5 4 N/A 5 4 N/A 5 4 N/A
Standardization 3,3 3,3 N/A 1,1 1,1 N/A 2,2 2,2 N/A 3,3 3,3 N/A
Component Count Index 3 2 1 3 2 1 3 4 1 3 4 1
Entanglement Index 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
Interface Characteristics
Strength 6 6 N/A 6 6 N/A 7 7 N/A 7 7 N/A
Irreversibility 5 4 N/A 5 4 N/A 5 4 N/A 5 4 N/A
Standardization 3,3 3,3 N/A 3,3 3,3 N/A 2,2 2,2 N/A 1,1 1,1 N/A
Shifter 2,750      * 2,670      4,420      4,200      
Derailleur 2,870      * 2,660      4,420      4,220      
Freewheel 2,580      * 2,700      4,170      4,180      
Brake 1,800      * 1,800      3,250      4,210      
Chain 1,650      * 1,700      3,260      4,190      
Hub 1,000      * 1,150      2,400      4,150      
Shifter N/A 4,180      7,460      6,810      
Derailleur N/A 4,350      7,620      6,810      
Freewheel N/A 4,140      7,000      6,550      
Brake N/A 3,630      5,420      6,790      
Chain N/A 2,110      6,170      6,550      
Hub N/A 1,310      3,060      6,380      
Type 1 5.6% * 13.4% 38.8% 94.2%
Type 2 16.3% * 19.4% 25.9% 3.5%
Type 3 20.5% * 17.2% 15.0% 0.6%
Type 4 19.1% * 17.2% 10.2% 0.0%
Type 5 24.2% * 17.9% 6.1% 0.0%
Type 6 8.8% * 11.9% 0.0% 0.0%
N/A 5.6% * 3.0% 4.1% 1.7%
Type 1 N/A 7.0% 46.8% 94.3%
Type 2 N/A 20.9% 23.4% 4.1%
Type 3 N/A 18.6% 4.3% 0.0%
Type 4 N/A 27.9% 13.8% 0.0%
Type 5 N/A 16.3% 5.3% 0.0%
Type 6 N/A 2.3% 0.0% 0.0%
N/A N/A 7.0% 6.4% 1.6%
* = Data from 1984
t1 = 1988 t2 = 1990
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Fig. A.1.7. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1990)
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Figure 1: Industry structure of the bicycle drivetrain component industry in 1984 (top) and in 
1990 (bottom) 
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Figure 2: Research framework 
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INTERFACES: Characteristics Strength  and Irreversibility
Components
STRENGTH of Interfaces (upper triangle)
(adapted from Pimmler and Eppinger 1994)
2 2 Nature:
0 0 Spatial S E Energy
1 1 1 Information I M Materials
1 0 0
1 2 1 2 Intensity:
0 0 0 0 Required 2
1 1 Desired 1
1 1 Indifferent 0
2 Undesired -1
1 Detrimental -2
IRREVERSIBILITY of Interfaces NUMBER of Interfaces
(lower triangle) real 4
theoretical max. 15
Effort 1 theoretical min. 5
Depth 1 real/max 27%
min/max 33%
Effort to reverse: Depth of interface:
easy 1 shallow 1
medium 2 medium 2
difficult 3 deep 3
Evaluation Aggregation per Function
Power Transmission Gear Shifting Brake actuation
Interface Strength 6 6
Interface Irreversibility 5 4
1 2
0
0
5 6
Components
Derailleur
Hub
D
er
ai
lle
ur
Fr
ee
w
he
el
C
ha
in
H
ub
Br
ak
e 
Le
ve
rs
Sh
ift
er
5
6
Freewheel
Chain
1
2
3
4
Brake Levers
Shifter
3 4
 
Figure 3: Measuring interface strength and interface irreversibility (Shimano at t-1=1980) 
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Figure 4: Measuring interface standardization (Shimano at t-1=1980) 
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Figure 5: Three mechanisms through with product architecture changes affected competition 
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 APPENDIX
 Fig. A.1.0 Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1980-1983)
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 Fig. A.1.1. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1984)
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Fig. A.1.2. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1985)
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The figures in this appendix are to be read as 
follows.  The six rows in each figure represent 
the market segments for brake levers, shifters, 
derailleurs, freewheels, chains, and hubs.  In each 
segment, the different colors show the market 
share of the three major bicycle drivetrain 
component firms (Shimano, SunTour, and 
Campagnolo) and the remaining firms grouped 
into ‘Others.’  In addition, we label the new 
introduction of an integral architecture with a 
solid-lined box, reflecting the loss of 
compatibility of the components of the new 
architecture to the neighboring components.  
These boxes are labeled with their brand names 
and their market share.   
Each figure represents a calendar year for 
either the road bicycle or the mountain bicycle 
market.  The figures are organized in two 
columns: the figures for the road bicycle market 
on the left, the figures on the mountain bicycle 
market on the right.  This way of presenting the 
data allows cross-market comparison within a 
year (horizontally), and market share and product 
architecture changes over time (vertically). 
 
 
 Fig. A.2.2. Product Architectures and Market shares (MTB 1985)
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Fig. A.1.3. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1986)
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Fig. A.1.4. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1987)
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Fig. A.1.5. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1988)
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Fig. A.2.3. Product Architectures and Market shares (MTB 1986)
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 Fig. A.2.4. Product Architectures and Market shares (MTB 1987)
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Fig. A.2.5. Product Architectures and Market shares (MTB 1988)
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 Fig. A.1.6. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1989)
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 Fig. A.2.6. Product Architectures and Market shares (MTB 1989)
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Fig. A.1.7. Product Architectures and Market shares (Road 1990)
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Fig. A.2.7. Product Architectures and Market shares (MTB 1990)
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